Super PACs by Briffault, Richard






Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation







  INTRODUCTION   
The most striking campaign finance development since the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC1 in Janu-
ary 2010 has not been an upsurge in corporate and union 
spending, as might have been expected from a decision invali-
dating the decades-old laws barring such expenditures. In-
stead, federal election campaigns have been marked by the 
emergence of an entirely new campaign vehicle, which uses—
but is not primarily dependent on—corporate or union funds, 
and which threatens to upend the federal campaign regulatory 
regime in place since 1974.  
The 2010 election cycle witnessed the birth of the “Super 
PAC”—a political action committee legally entitled to raise do-
nations in unlimited amounts. Nonexistent and probably illegal 
before the spring of 2010, Super PACs spent an estimated $65 
million on independent expenditures in 2010, and were signifi-
cant players in more than a dozen Senate and House races.2 By 
early 2012, Super PACs were already major participants in the 
 
†  Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law 
School. Copyright © 2012 by Richard Briffault. 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 2. The Center for Responsive Politics estimated total Super PAC inde-
pendent expenditures in the 2010 election cycle at $65.3 million. See Ctr. for 
Responsive Politics, 2010 Outside Spending, by Super PACs, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG (Feb. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 
2010 Outside Spending], http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ 
.php?cycle=2010&chrt=V&disp=O&type=S (adding that the “Independent Ex-
penditures” column equals approximately $65.33 million). The Congressional 
Research Service found that Super PACs spent $90.4 million in 2010, with 
about seventy percent of that, or approximately $63 million, devoted to inde-
pendent spending and the rest spent on administrative costs. See R. SAM 
GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42042, “SUPER PACS” IN FEDERAL ELEC-
TIONS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 13 (2011). In 2010, Super PAC 
spending exceeded ten percent of total candidate spending in sixteen Senate 
and House elections. Id. at 19–20. 
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2011–2012 election cycle, significantly outspending the candi-
dates in the early Republican presidential nominating con-
tests.3 Some Super PACs had spent millions of dollars on Sen-
ate general election contests that were more than ten months 
away.4 Although some Super PAC funds come from corpora-
tions and unions, the vast majority have been provided by 
wealthy individuals who, well before Citizens United, were 
permitted to spend unlimited sums independently, but were 
subject to a federal statutory limit of $5000 on the amounts 
they could give to the federal PACs that expressly support or 
oppose federal candidates.5 Citizens United did not address the 
statutory limits on individual donations to PACs. The Court’s 
overruling of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce6 and 
the pertinent part of McConnell v. Federal FEC7 focused on the 
constitutional status of corporate campaign participation and 
the protection of independent spending, not on the rules gov-
erning contributions to political committees.8 The authorization 
of Super PACs followed directly from lower court decisions, in-
cluding two that predated Citizens United and advisory opin-
ions of the Federal Election Commission (FEC). But Citizens 
United—particularly the Supreme Court’s flat assertion that 
independent expenditures, whatever their actual effect on the 
political process, raise no danger of corruption or the appear-
ance of corruption9 within the meaning of Buckley v. Valeo10—
 
 3. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Super PACs Outspend Campaigns 2 to 1 in S.C., 
WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2012, at A6. 
 4. See, e.g., Tom Hamburger & Melanie Mason, ‘Super PACs’ Show Pow-
er, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2012, at A1 (“In Ohio, $3 million in ads . . . have al-
ready been aired against the state’s incumbent Democratic senator, Sherrod 
Brown—a year before the election.”); Manu Raju, Scott Brown, Elizabeth War-
ren Call for Super PAC Cease-Fire, POLITICO (Jan. 16, 2012, 1:42 PM), http:// 
www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/71484.html (reporting that, as of early 
January 2012, Super PACs had spent at least $3.5 million on the November 
2012 Massachusetts United States Senate race).  
 5. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(1)(C) (2006), declared unconstitutional by 
SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ( limit on individual 
donations to a regular, non-Super PAC is $5,000 per calendar year); Fredreka 
Schouten et al., Individuals, Not Corporations, Drive Super PAC Financing, 
USA TODAY, Feb. 9, 2012, at A7 (“Nearly two-thirds of the $95 million that 
flowed into super PACs driving presidential and congressional politics came 
from wealthy individuals . . . .”). 
 6. 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (per curiam). 
 7. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 8. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899–913 (2010). 
 9. Id. at 908–11. 
 10. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
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provided crucial doctrinal support for the legal actions that 
launched Super PACs and enabled them to flourish. The rise of 
Super PACs indicates that the real impact of Citizens United 
may be the re-validation of the unlimited use of private wealth 
in elections, not just spending by corporations and unions.  
This Article considers the emergence of Super PACs and 
their implications for the future of American campaign finance 
law. Part I explains what a Super PAC is and how it differs 
from other campaign finance vehicles. Part II analyzes the law 
of Super PACs, including the doctrinal tension out of which 
they emerged and the court and agency decisions authorizing 
their existence and operations. Part III examines the place of 
Super PACs in the campaign finance system, particularly their 
role in the 2010 congressional elections and their potential im-
pact on the 2012 races based on fundraising and spending as of 
early 2012. In their brief life span, Super PACs have already 
begun to evolve from general ideological or partisan committees 
to vehicles for advancing or opposing the fortunes of specific 
candidates. This threatens to obliterate the significance of the 
limits on contributions to candidates that have been a center-
piece of federal campaign finance regulation since the post-
Watergate reforms enacted in 1974. Part IV concludes by con-
sidering the implications of Super PACs for the future of Amer-
ican campaign finance law. 
I.  WHAT IS A SUPER PAC AND HOW DOES IT DIFFER 
FROM OTHER CAMPAIGN FINANCE ACTORS?   
A Super PAC is a political committee, registered with the 
FEC, and subject to the federal organizational, registration, re-
porting, and disclosure requirements that apply to other politi-
cal committees.11 A Super PAC makes independent expendi-
tures expressly supporting or opposing candidates for federal 
office, but does not make any contributions to federal candi-
dates.12 Indeed, it is often formally referred to as an “independ-
 
 11. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 432–434 (2006 & Supp. IV) (codifying “political  
committees”). 
 12. See GARRETT, supra note 2, at 3 (defining a Super PAC). As a result of 
a federal district court order, the FEC has also authorized so-called hybrid 
PACs that can both accept unlimited donations to finance independent ex-
penditures and accept contributions, subject to the restrictions that ordinarily 
apply to contributions to PACs, to be used to make contributions to candi-
dates. A hybrid PAC must keep the funds for its contributions and independ-
ent spending separate, but it can operate as a Super PAC with respect to its 
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ent expenditure committee” or an “independent expenditure-
only PAC.”13 An ordinary, non-Super PAC can both make con-
tributions to candidates and engage in independent spending 
that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly iden-
tified candidate for federal office, whereas a Super PAC can on-
ly make independent expenditures and is barred from making 
direct candidate contributions.14 The very silver lining to the 
dark cloud of inability to contribute is that the rules limiting 
contributions to ordinary PACs do not apply to Super PACs.15 
Federal law limits an individual’s contribution to a PAC to 
$5000 per year.16 Corporations and unions cannot donate 
treasury funds to a PAC, although a corporation or union can 
create its own PAC and use treasury funds to pay for the PAC’s 
administrative costs and to solicit individual contributions to 
the PAC from people affiliated with the corporation or union.17 
But there are no restrictions on the size of donations to Super 
PACs and no prohibitions on the contribution of corporate or 
union treasury funds.18 Both PACs and Super PACs can engage 
in unlimited amounts of independent spending. But only Super 
PACs can fund that unlimited spending by collecting unlimited 
amounts in contributions from individuals, corporations, and 
unions. This gives the Super PAC the capacity to raise and 
spend far more money than the standard PAC. 
 
independent spending and as an ordinary PAC with respect to its contribu-
tions. See infra notes 157–64 and accompanying text.  
 13. Technically, the term “political action committee” or “PAC” does not 
exist under federal law. The law recognizes and regulates a “political commit-
tee,” which is defined as any committee, club, association, or other group of 
persons that receives contributions in excess of $1000 or makes expenditures 
in excess of $1000 in a calendar year to influence elections for federal office. 2 
U.S.C. § 431(4)(A). Political committees also include the “separate, segregated 
fund[s]” created by corporations and unions—which are barred from using 
their treasury funds to contribute to candidates under § 441b(a)—to make con-
tributions in federal elections. Id. §§ 431(4)(B), 441b. Because the first com-
mittee created by a labor union in the 1940s to get around the restriction on 
direct union support for federal candidates was called the Political Action 
Committee, political committees have long been known as PACs. Anthony 
Corrado, Money and Politics: A History of Campaign Finance Law, in NEW 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 7, 18 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 2005). 
 14. GARRETT, supra note 2, at 3. As explained supra note 12, there are al-
so hybrid PACs that can both make contributions to candidates with funds 
subject to federal contribution restrictions and undertake independent spend-
ing with funds not subject to contribution restrictions. 
 15. Id. 
 16. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C). 
 17. Id. § 441b. 
 18. GARRETT, supra note 2, at 3–6. 
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Super PACs are related to, but distinguishable from, two 
other independent spending vehicles that have loomed large in 
recent elections—section 527 committees and section 501(c) or-
ganizations. Both “527” and “501(c)” refer to provisions of the 
Internal Revenue Code. Section 527 is the provision of the Code 
that exempts from federal income taxation contributions given 
to organizations operating primarily to influence elections to 
the extent that the contributions are used for electoral purpos-
es.19 Although technically all political committees are 527 or-
ganizations for tax purposes, the term is generally used to de-
scribe so-called outside committees—that is, committees other 
than candidate, party, or political action committees—that par-
ticipate in elections.20 Although for tax purposes these outside 
527s are electoral organizations, they are not “political commit-
tees” within the meaning of the Federal Election Campaign Act 
(FECA).21 Therefore, they need not register with the FEC and 
abide by other FECA requirements and restrictions as long as 
they avoid engaging in campaign communications that involve 
“express advocacy,”22 that is, expressly calling for the election 
or defeat of clearly identified federal candidates.23 527s are re-
quired by the Internal Revenue Code to publicly disclose donors 
who give more than $200—the same threshold FECA applies to 
political committees24—but the 527 disclosure is enforced by 
the IRS, not the FEC.25 Like Super PACs, 527s are not subject 
to FECA’s dollar limits and source restrictions on contributions 
to FEC political committees, and there are no limits on how 
much they can spend.26  
Unlike 527s, section 501(c) organizations—particularly 
those covered by 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) of the tax code—are 
not primarily electoral. Instead they are civic leagues and so-
cial welfare organizations ((c)(4)s), labor unions ((c)(5)s), and 
trade associations and chambers of commerce ((c)(6)s).27 These 
 
 19. See generally Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem . . . and the Buckley 
Problem, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 949 (2005) (providing a basic overview of 
527s). 
 20. See id. at 954 (“[T]he 527s are not parties, and they do not have the 
same relationship to candidates that the parties enjoy.”). 
 21. Id. at 951–52. 
 22. See id. at 955–60.  
 23. Id. 
 24. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(F) (2006). 
 25. I.R.C. §§ 527( j)(2)(B), 6104(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 26. Briffault, supra note 19, at 950–51. 
 27. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)–(6). 
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entities may engage in political activity to advance their public 
policy goals and may even enter the electoral arena, as long as 
that is not their primary purpose and political spending is not 
their primary expense.28 They can spend without limit on elec-
tion-related activity, including electioneering communications, 
so long as electoral spending is less than half of their total 
spending within a year.29 They are also exempt from any FECA 
restrictions on the donations they receive.30 501(c)’s are re-
quired to disclose information to the IRS about donors who give 
$5000 or more in a single year, but this information is not made 
public.31 FEC disclosure applies to 501(c) contributors only if 
the contributor specifically earmarks her contribution for fed-
eral electioneering communications or express advocacy.32 
Thus, all three types or organizations—Super PACs, 527s, 
and 501(c)s—may engage in election-related spending without 
dollar limits and accept contributions to pay for that spending 
from individuals, corporations, and unions without dollar lim-
its. Super PACs are subject to FECA disclosure of their donors, 
and 527s are subject to IRS disclosure of their donors, while 
501(c)s are not required to publicly disclose their donors at 
all.33 527 committees have to eschew express advocacy in order 
to avoid being regulated as FEC political committees, and 
501(c)s must limit their electoral spending to less than half 
 
 28. See Miriam Galston, When Statutory Regimes Collide: Will Citizens 
United and Wisconsin Right to Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of Cam-
paign Activity Unconstitutional?, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 867, 876 n.29 (2011) 
(describing the “primarily” standard of organizational purpose under § 501(c)). 
 29. Id. 
 30. The Supreme Court has held that FECA applies only to “organizations 
that are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the 
nomination or election of a candidate.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976). 
By definition, a 501(c) group cannot have electoral politics as its primary or 
main purpose. Galston, supra note 28. 
 31. See I.R.C. §§ 6033, 6104. 
 32. See 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9) (2011) (disclosure of contributors who fund 
electioneering communication), § 109.10(e)(1)(vi) (disclosure of contributors 
who fund independent expenditures). On March 30, 2012, the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to the 
plaintiffs in a suit challenging the FEC’s regulation limiting the scope of dis-
closure. Under the FEC rule, which the court concluded was inconsistent with 
the disclosure statute, a corporation or union that engages in electioneering 
communications subject to federal reporting requirements need disclose only 
those donors above a threshold level who earmarked their donations for the 
purpose of furthering electioneering communications. Van Hollen v. FEC, Civ. 
No. 11–0766, 2012 WL 1066717, at *16 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2012). 
 33. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 432–434 (2006); I.R.C. §§ 527( j)(2)(B), 6033, 6104.  
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their total spending in an annual period.34 Super PACs, howev-
er, can devote all their spending to electioneering and engage in 
express advocacy.35 The trade-off for their greater freedom to 
spend is that they are subject to FECA’s more stringent disclo-
sure  
requirements.36 
Despite these formal legal differences, these organizations 
are often closely connected. One interest group can sponsor a 
527, a 501(c), a Super PAC, and an ordinary PAC. The largest 
Super PAC in 2010, American Crossroads, was linked to a 
prominent 501(c)(4), American Crossroads Grassroots Political 
Strategies.37 Although each type of entity is required to abides 
by a particular set of rules, enjoys distinct opportunities, and is 
subject to different restraints, one organization can sponsor 
committees in each of these legal forms and these committees 
can operate as political networks rather than as isolated organ-
izations.38 Donors who prefer anonymity can take advantage of 
a 501(c)(4)’s exemption from public disclosure, although as we 
shall see donors have also found ways to give to Super PACs 
and avoid disclosure. On the other hand, donors who are less 
concerned about disclosure and who do not want the committee 
they are funding to have to watch its words or worry about 
maintaining its 501(c) tax status can now give unlimited finan-
cial support to a Super PAC. According to former FEC Chair-
man Michael Toner, Super PACs have “effectively replac[ed]” 
527 organizations because of their ability to engage in express 
advocacy.39 
 
 34. See supra notes 22–23, 30–32 and accompanying text.  
 35. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.  
 36. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
 37. See Peter Overby, Powerful GOP-Linked SuperPAC Has Clear Agenda, 
NPR.ORG (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/02/09/146613016/powerful 
-gop-linked-superpac-has-clear-agenda (“The superPAC American Crossroads 
works with a partner, a nonprofit ‘issues’ group called Crossroads GPS, which 
[American Crossroads CEO Stephen] Law also runs.”). 
 38. See Jessica Yellin, Crossroads’ $51 Million Haul, CNN.COM (Jan. 31, 
2012), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/01/31/crossroads-51-million-haul/ 
(“Together American Crossroads and Crossroads GPS raised $51 million in 
2011 . . . . American Crossroads the super PAC raised $18.4 million and Cross-
roads GPS raised $32.6 million.”). 
 39. Michael E. Toner et al., What Is a Super PAC?, ELECTION L. NEWS 
(Wiley Rein LLP, Wash. D.C.), Sept. 2011, at 7, available at http://www 
.wileyrein.com/publications.cfm?sp=articles&newsletter=8&id=7458. 
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II.  THE LAW OF SUPER PACS   
A. BACKGROUND: THE DOCTRINAL DIFFICULTY  
Super PACs emerged out of the tension at the heart of the 
central holding in the Supreme Court’s foundational campaign 
finance decision, Buckley v. Valeo.40 In Buckley, the Court held 
that the First Amendment permits limits on campaign finance 
activities in order to prevent corruption or the appearance of 
corruption.41 Contributions to candidates can be limited be-
cause a large contribution raises the danger “of a political quid 
pro quo” and “public awareness of the opportunities for abuse 
inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions” 
undermines confidence in our system of government.42 So, too, 
contributions to organizations that make contributions to can-
didates, and expenditures that such organizations coordinate 
with the candidates they support, can be limited to prevent cir-
cumvention of the limit on direct contributions to candidates.43 
On the other hand, Buckley determined that candidate expend-
itures and independent expenditures—that is, expenditures on 
campaign activities by individuals and groups not affiliated 
with a candidate but supporting or opposing a candidate—may 
not be limited.44 Buckley held that limiting independent ex-
penditures “heavily burdens core First Amendment expres-
sion,” which could not be justified by the anti-corruption inter-
est that sustains contribution limits.45 In so ruling, the Court’s 
reasoning was at least partially empirical. The Court assumed 
that:  
[u]nlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well pro-
vide little assistance to the candidate’s campaign and indeed may 
prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordi-
nation of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only un-
dermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alle-
viates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo 
for improper commitments from the candidate.46 
Buckley flatly rejected the idea that any “governmental in-
terest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and 
groups to influence the outcome of elections” could support a 
 
 40. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 41. Id. at 26–30. 
 42. Id. at 26–27. 
 43. Id. at 46 n.53. 
 44. Id. at 44–45, 51–54. 
 45. Id. at 47–48. 
 46. Id. at 47. 
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limit on independent spending.47 With equality not a permissi-
ble justification for limiting independent spending and the an-
ticorruption concern that justified limits on contributions not 
available to support limits on independent spending, Buckley 
held that independent spending could not be subject to limits. 
But what about contributions to organizations that engage 
in independent spending? Can those contributions be limited? 
Buckley upheld FECA’s limit on individual donations to candi-
dates,48 its limit on donations by political committees to candi-
dates,49 and its aggregate limit on all contributions an individu-
al can make to candidates and political committees in a calendar 
year.50 But it did not specifically address FECA’s $5000-per-year 
cap on individual donations to political committees.  
Arguably, the Court implicitly addressed and resolved the 
question when it upheld FECA’s aggregate limit on all individ-
ual donations to federal election committees, which was 
$25,000 per year when Buckley was decided,51 and is now 
$117,000 per biennial election cycle.52 The Court found that the 
aggregate limit was necessary to prevent evasion of the mone-
tary cap on individual donations to candidates “by a person who 
might otherwise contribute massive amounts of money to a par-
ticular candidate through the use of unearmarked political con-
tributions to political committees likely to contribute to that 
candidate, or huge contributions to the candidate’s political 
party.”53 But the Court’s analysis appears to assume that dona-
tions to political committees could be limited only because such 
committees function as conduits passing along the donations to 
candidates or because of the close association between a candi-
date and his political party.54 Buckley left open whether a limit 
could be imposed on donations to committees that are not par-
ties or conduits but make only independent expenditures. 
 
 47. Id. at 48–49 (rejecting the equalization argument on First Amend-
ment grounds). 
 48. Id. at 23–35. 
 49. Id. at 35–36. 
 50. Id. at 38. 
 51. See id. at 38 (discussing the $25,000 limit on total contributions in a 
calendar year). 
 52. See Contributions, FEC (Feb. 2011), http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/ 
contrib.shtml ( listing the current federal campaign contribution limits). 
 53. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38.  
 54. See id. (explaining that the cap on total contributions stops contribu-
tors from avoiding the cap on contributions to candidates by giving to political 
committees which can then use that money to support the contributor’s chosen 
candidates).  
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That question was affected, but not clearly resolved, by 
several other Supreme Court decisions in the years before Citi-
zens United. Five years after Buckley, in California Medical 
Ass’n v. FEC (CalMed), the Court upheld the application of 
FECA’s limit on contributions to a political committee in a case 
involving donations by a trade association to its own PAC.55 
Although there would seem to be little danger that an organi-
zation could corrupt its own PAC, the Court’s plurality opinion 
by Justice Marshall emphasized that the limit on donations to 
political committees prevented circumvention of the limit on di-
rect contributions to candidates.56 The key fifth vote came from 
Justice Blackmun who, in a concurring opinion, agreed that the 
limit could be upheld “as a means of preventing evasion of the 
limitations on contributions to a candidate.”57 Justice 
Blackmun, however, went on to suggest that “a different result 
would follow” if the donation cap “were applied to contributions 
to a political committee established for the purpose of making 
independent expenditures, rather than contributions to candi-
dates,” because “a committee that makes only independent ex-
penditures poses no . . . threat” of corruption or the appearance 
of corruption.58  
Technically dictum, Justice Blackmun’s CalMed concur-
rence was bolstered by a second decision later that year, Citi-
zens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley (CARC), in which 
the Court invalidated a municipal ordinance capping contribu-
tions to committees formed to support or oppose ballot proposi-
tions.59 The Court had previously found that ballot-proposition 
elections pose no danger of corruption as they do not involve 
the election of a candidate, so spending in support of or opposi-
tion to ballot questions could not be limited.60 As a result, the 
Court in CARC concluded there was no anticorruption justifica-
tion for the “significant restraint on the freedom of expression 
of groups and those individuals who wish to express their views 
through committees.”61 
 
 55. 453 U.S. 182, 184–86, 201 (1981). 
 56. Id. at 197–99. 
 57. Id. at 203 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 58. Id. 
 59. 454 U.S. 290, 291, 300 (1981). 
 60. See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978) (noting that 
the risk of corruption present in candidate elections does not exist in issue 
elections). 
 61. CARC, 454 U.S. at 299. 
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Justice Blackmun’s concurring dictum in CalMed and the 
Court’s CARC decision together indicate there is no constitu-
tional basis for limiting contributions to an organization if nei-
ther the contribution itself nor the activity it is funding poses a 
danger of corruption. But when does a contribution or expendi-
ture pose a sufficient danger of corruption that it may be regu-
lated? Although Buckley likened corruption to the danger that 
“large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro 
quo,” the Court stressed the risk of corruption even in ar-
rangements that do not amount to a bribe.62 Rather, the possi-
bility of corruption extends beyond “blatant and specific at-
tempts of those with money to influence governmental 
action.”63 In a later case, the Court emphasized that the corrup-
tion concern “extend[s] to the broader threat from politicians 
too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”64 
The Court’s conception of the nature of the “corruption” 
that could justify restriction was dramatically expended in 
2003 in McConnell v. FEC, which upheld the soft-money re-
strictions Congress imposed in the Bipartisan Campaign Re-
form Act of 2002 (BCRA).65 Soft money consisted of donations 
by wealthy individuals that were dramatically greater than the 
dollar limitations applicable to individual donations to candi-
dates and contributions by corporations and unions, notwith-
standing the longstanding ban on corporate and union dona-
tions to federal candidates.66 The conceptual basis for soft 
money’s evasion of federal contribution restrictions was that 
the donations did not go to specific candidates, or to parties for 
direct support of specific candidates, but instead were given to 
pay for party activities that aided candidates only indirectly, 
such as voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives, generic 
party advertising, or campaign ads that did not expressly advo-
cate the election or defeat of clearly identified federal candi-
dates.67 In the absence of a direct relationship between the do-
nor and a specific candidate, defenders of soft money claimed 
 
 62. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–29 (1975) (per curiam).  
 63. Id. at 28.  
 64. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000). 
 65. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 66. See id. at 122–26 (describing soft-money).  
 67. See id. at 123 (discussing the FEC’s ruling that parties could use soft 
money to fund “mixed-purpose activities” that support multiple candidates on 
a party’s ticket). 
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there was no danger of corruption.68 McConnell, however, found 
substantial evidence that federal officeholders and party lead-
ers avidly sought soft money even if given to party accounts 
they did not control, and that wealthy individuals, corpora-
tions, and unions provided soft money “for the express purpose 
of securing influence over federal officials.”69 Under these cir-
cumstances, there was no need for an express donor-candidate 
relationship or for proof of a tie between a donation and a spe-
cific legislative or other governmental goal of the donor to es-
tablish “corruption.” Rather, the Court took a much broader 
approach, concluding that Congress could reasonably deter-
mine that money given to party committees to enable donors to 
obtain preferential access to officials and thereby influence 
government decision making could constitute corruption suffi-
cient to justify restriction.70 
Although McConnell did not address independent spend-
ing, the Court’s more capacious definition of corruption in 
terms of the opportunity for influence resulting from the pref-
erential access gained by campaign money suggests that Buck-
ley’s quasi-empirical rejection of an anti-corruption justification 
for limiting independent spending might be subject to reconsid-
eration on a showing that independent spending was also a 
source of preferential access and influence. Other cases had al-
so left open the possibility that independent spending could be 
shown to have corrupting effects. In First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, even as it struck down a state ban on corpo-
rate spending in ballot proposition elections, the Court 
acknowledged that “Congress might well be able to demon-
strate the existence of a danger of real or apparent corruption 
in independent expenditures by corporations to influence can-
didate elections.”71 Similarly, when it struck down limits on in-
dependent expenditures in support of or opposition to presiden-
tial candidates who had accepted public funding, the Court 
acknowledged that it is “hypothetically possible . . . that candi-
dates may take notice of and reward those responsible for PAC 
[independent] expenditures by giving official favors to the lat-
ter in exchange for the supporting messages.”72 In Austin v. 
 
 68. See, e.g., id. at 149–50 (discussing the arguments of soft-money  
defenders). 
 69. Id. at 147. 
 70. Id. at 142–54. 
 71. 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26, 795 (1978).  
 72. FEC v. Nat’l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985). 
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Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Court upheld on anticor-
ruption grounds a state law prohibiting corporate independent 
expenditures,73 albeit in an opinion that emphasized the special 
“state-conferred” advantages provided by the corporate form.74 
So, too, the Court in McConnell approved BCRA’s extension of 
the comparable federal ban to corporate and union electioneer-
ing communications that did not involve express electoral advo-
cacy.75 In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., the Court 
found that an independent expenditure could be just as cor-
rupting as a contribution of comparable size when it held that a 
judge elected after an election campaign in which he had been 
the beneficiary of millions of dollars of independent spending 
was required by the Constitution to recuse himself from a case 
involving the independent spender.76 Given the size of the in-
dependent expenditure in question, “there is a serious risk of 
bias—based on objective and reasonable perceptions.”77 Stun-
ningly, Caperton completely blurred the contribu-
tion/expenditure distinction first developed in Buckley and 
carefully sustained by the Court for over thirty-three years 
when it repeatedly referred to the very large independent ex-
penditures at issue in the case as “contributions.”78 To be sure, 
Caperton was a due process case that did not turn on the First 
Amendment or involve any limits on independent spending. 
Nevertheless, Caperton at least tacitly recognized there are cir-
cumstances in which independent expenditures have the same 
potential to corruptly influence the actions of elected officials as  
contributions. 
Thus, on the eve of Citizens United there were two strands 
in Supreme Court doctrine that pointed in different directions 
if restrictions on contributions to political committees that 
make only independent expenditures were ever challenged. On 
the one hand, CARC and Justice Blackmun’s dictum in his 
CalMed concurrence implied that contributions to independent 
expenditure-only committees may not be limited because inde-
pendent expenditures pose no danger of corruption. On the oth-
er hand, McConnell and Caperton broadened the Court’s work-
ing definition of corruption, and McConnell found that 
 
 73. 494 U.S. 652, 698–99 (1990). 
 74. Id. at 660. 
 75. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 203–09. 
 76. 556 U.S. 868, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265–67 (2009). 
 77. Id. at 2263. 
 78. Id. at 2263–65. 
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contributions not tied to any candidate’s campaign could be 
limited on a showing that such contributions enabled their do-
nors to obtain preferential access to elected officials. Although 
McConnell did not address independent expenditures, its con-
cern with the influence obtained by soft-money donations could 
provide support for restrictions on donations to independent 
groups if and when it could be demonstrated that such dona-
tions are also a means of obtaining preferential access to elect-
ed officials. 
B. LOWER COURT STIRRINGS 
The question of whether contributions to independent 
groups could be limited became more salient in the 2000s after 
Congress adopted, and the Court sustained, BCRA’s soft-money 
restrictions. Due to BCRA’s much tighter regulation of soft-
money contributions to political parties, some donors—
particularly very wealthy individuals—began to make very 
large contributions to 527 committees.79 This led to new pro-
posals, arguably bolstered by McConnell’s validation of the re-
strictions on party soft money, to more closely regulate the 
527s.  
1. North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake 
In 2003, in North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit struck 
down a North Carolina law capping individual contributions to 
independent expenditure committees.80 The court determined 
the state had “failed to proffer sufficiently convincing evidence 
which demonstrates that there is a danger of corruption due to 
the presence of unchecked contributions” to independent ex-
penditure-only committees.81 The court cited and quoted Jus-
tice Blackmun’s CalMed concurrence, but did not treat it as ab-
solutely barring restrictions on donations to independent 
expenditure-only committees.82 Rather, it concluded that limit-
ing such donations required more evidence of a corrupting ef-
fect than was needed to justify limits on donations to candidate 
committees, and it found the state had failed to carry that 
 
 79. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 19, at 964–65. 
 80. 344 F.3d 418, 433–34 (4th Cir. 2003).  
 81. Id. at 434. 
 82. Id. (citing Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 435 U.S. 182, 203 (1981) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring)).  
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heavier burden of proof.83 That decision was vacated and re-
manded by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of 
McConnell,84 but in 2008 the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed its orig-
inal position.85 The court emphasized that McConnell had up-
held limits only on contributions to political parties, which, as 
McConnell itself had noted, are closely tied to candidates, “have 
special access to and relationships with” elected officials, and 
“have influence and power in the Legislature that vastly ex-
ceeds that of any interest group.”86 With independent commit-
tees “further removed from the candidate” than political par-
ties, the Fourth Circuit restated its prior position that “it is 
‘implausible’ that contributions to independent expenditure po-
litical committees are corrupting.”87 Leake did not completely 
rule out the possibility that contributions to independent ex-
penditure committees could be limited, finding that such a limit 
could be upheld if North Carolina could “produce convincing ev-
idence of corruption” resulting from independent committee ac-
tivities.88 But substantial independent committee spending 
alone—even spending targeted at specific candidates or that in-
fluenced candidates’ positions—did not constitute the suffi-
ciently convincing evidence of corruption that the court deemed 
necessary to support limits on contributions to independent ex-
penditure committees.89 
2.  EMILY’s List v. FEC  
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit in EMILY’s List v. FEC grew di-
rectly out of the efforts of the FEC to deal with the surging role 
of nonprofit 527 committees in the aftermath of BCRA’s imposi-
tion of limits on political party soft money.90 Like many 527s, 
EMILY’s List engaged in both election-related activities in sup-
port of or opposition to federal candidates and broader get-out-
the-vote and voter registration activities not tied to a particular 
candidate. It also paid for communications referring to a par-
ticular party, but not particular candidates, and advertise-
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Leake v. N.C. Right to Life, Inc., 541 U.S. 1007, 124 S. Ct. 2065, 2065 
(2004). 
 85. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 308 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 86. Id. at 293 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 95, 188 (2003)). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. 581 F.3d 1, 4–5 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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ments or communications that referred to candidates, but did 
not expressly advocate their election or defeat. To make sure 
that only hard money—that is, contributions that complied 
with FECA’s dollar limits and source prohibitions—was used to 
pay for the efforts of 527s that support federal candidates, the 
FEC adopted rules requiring that at least some of a 527s non-
candidate-specific activities, which could also benefit federal 
candidates, be funded in part by hard money.91 Thus, the FEC’s 
rules required that half of the costs of generic get-out-the-vote 
and voter registration activities, half of the cost of communica-
tions that refer to a party only, half of the committee’s adminis-
trative expenses, and at least some portion of the cost of adver-
tisements that refer to federal candidates be paid for with hard 
money.92  
EMILY’s List struck down these requirements as unconsti-
tutional.93 In the course of its analysis, Judge Kavanaugh’s 
opinion initially considered an issue not before the court—
whether donations to independent expenditure-only committees 
could be limited.94 Relying heavily on Justice Blackmun’s 
CalMed concurrence and on CARC, he determined that as in-
dependent expenditures are not corrupting, the contributions 
funding them could not be corrupting.95 In the court’s view, 
McConnell did not affect this analysis, as McConnell’s valida-
tion of limits on contributions not going to particular candi-
dates applied only to contributions to political parties.96 Those 
limits were justified by “the close ties between candidates and 
parties and the extensive record evidence [before the 
McConnell court] of what it deemed a threat of actual or appar-
ent corruption—specifically, the access to federal officials and 
candidates that large soft-money contributors to political par-
ties received in exchange for their contributions.”97 In the ab-
sence of “record evidence that non-profit entities have sold ac-
cess to federal candidates and officeholders in exchange for 
large contributions,” contributions to non-profit independent 
 
 91. Id. at 16–17. 
 92. See id. at 15–18.  
 93. Id. at 3. 
 94. Id. at 8–11. 
 95. Id. at 11. 
 96. Id. at 13. 
 97. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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spending committees, unlike contributions to parties, could not 
be limited.98  
EMILY’s List’s discussion of independent expenditure-only 
committees was technically dicta; EMILY’s List both made con-
tributions to candidates and engaged in independent spend-
ing.99 As a result, EMILY’s List and committees like it could be 
required to make their contributions to federal candidates only 
from contributions that observed federal dollar limits and 
source restrictions, and could be required to “pay an appropri-
ately tailored share of administrative expenses associated with 
their contributions” from their hard-money accounts.100 But the 
court relied on its finding that contributions to independent ex-
penditure-only committees could not be limited in holding that 
EMILY’s List and similar committees could not be required to 
use dollar- or source-limited hard-money contributions to pay 
for expenditures that were not contributions to candidates or 
associated administrative expenses.101  
Leake and EMILY’s List, thus, rejected the argument that 
McConnell’s reasoning—particularly its focus on the political 
influence a large donation can win a donor even when the do-
nation does not go directly to a candidate—supported regula-
tion of contributions to independent committees that were not 
used to pay for contributions to candidates.102 McConnell was 
cabined as a political parties case, not treated as a more gen-
eral principle supporting limits on any donations that could 
win the donor political favors.103 To be sure, both Leake and 
EMILY’s List left open the possibility that limits on donations 
to independent committees could be sustained on a showing 
that independent committees “sold access to federal candidates 
and officeholders in exchange for large contributions.”104 But 
both courts expressed considerable doubts that such evidence 
 
 98. Id. at 14. 
 99. Id. at 12. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 14. 
 102. Id. at 13–14; N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 293 (4th 
Cir. 2003). 
 103. See EMILY’s List, 581 F.3d at 13–14; N.C. Right to Life, Inc., 525 F.3d 
at 293. 
 104. EMILY’s List, 581 F.3d at 14; see also N.C. Right to Life, Inc., 525 F.3d 
at 293 (“Given the remove [sic] of independent expenditure committees from 
candidates themselves, we must require North Carolina to produce convincing 
evidence of corruption before upholding contribution limits as applied to such 
organizations.”). 
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could ever be found.105 Citizens United soon shut the door to the 
possibility that independent spending could ever be deemed 
corrupting, thereby setting the stage for the authorization of 
Super PACs a few months after that. 
C. CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC  
Barely six months after Caperton blurred contributions 
with independent expenditures and treated the latter as having 
effects on beneficiaries comparable to the former, Citizens Unit-
ed determined that independent expenditures raised no danger 
of the corruption that would justify limitation.106 Citizens Unit-
ed sharply distinguished the concerns about undue influence, 
special access, and the favoritism resulting from large dona-
tions, which had loomed so large in McConnell from the corrup-
tion that Buckley required to justify campaign finance re-
strictions. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy declared, 
“[t]he fact that speakers may have influence over or access to 
elected officials does not mean that these officials are cor-
rupt.”107 Similarly, “[i]ngratiation and access, in any event, are 
not corruption.”108 So, too, the “appearance of influence or ac-
cess . . . will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democ-
racy” and thus cannot provide a basis for regulation in the 
name of preventing the “appearance . . . of corruption.”109 Most 
strikingly, the Court appeared to acknowledge that independ-
ent spending might actually sometimes be corrupting in fact 
when it observed that elected officials might “succumb to im-
proper influences from independent expenditures.”110 Indeed, 
Justice Kennedy observed, “if they surrender their best judg-
ment, and if they put expediency before principle, then surely 
there is cause for concern.”111 But even that concern could not 
support limits on independent expenditures, regardless of the 
empirical evidence of their effects on the elected officials who 
benefit from them.112 To that end, Caperton was dismissed as a 
case about a litigant’s due process right to a fair trial before an 
 
 105. EMILY’s List, 581 F.3d at 14; N.C. Right to Life, Inc., 525 F.3d at 293.  
 106. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 911. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 910–11. 
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unbiased judge; it did not provide support for any limits on 
campaign spending.113 
Noting its prior case law had left “open the possibility” that 
independent expenditures “could be shown to cause corrup-
tion,” Citizens United spoke firmly and categorically: “[W]e now 
conclude that independent expenditures, including those made 
by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appear-
ance of corruption.”114 
Citizens United was a case about the rights of corporations 
to make independent expenditures. It said nothing at all about 
the rights of wealthy individuals to make contributions to inde-
pendent committees Indeed, the Court made much of the con-
tribution/expenditure distinction in invalidating limits on cor-
porate spending.115 Prior cases that had upheld limits on 
corporate contributions, and even on a corporation’s solicitation 
of contributions to its PAC,116 were dismissed as of “little rele-
vance here”117 as those “involved contribution limits” while Cit-
izens United was an independent spending case.118 But within a 
few months, Citizens United was invoked to strike down the 
limits on donations to independent expenditure committees, re-
sulting in the emergence of Super PACs. 
D. SPEECHNOW.ORG V. FEC 
Less than one week after Citizens United, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit sit-
ting en banc heard oral argument in the challenge brought by 
SpeechNow.org (SpeechNow), an unincorporated nonprofit as-
sociation that sought to engage in express advocacy independ-
ent spending in support of federal candidates.119 SpeechNow 
stated it would acquire funds only from individuals and not 
from corporations.120 SpeechNow claimed it would be unconsti-
tutional to require it to register as a FECA political committee 
and to abide by federal reporting and disclosure requirements 
and contribution restrictions; as the organization would not 
make any contributions to candidates its activities assertedly 
 
 113. Id. at 910. 
 114. Id. at 909. 
 115. Id.  
 116. See FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982). 
 117. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909. 
 118. Id. 
 119. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
 120. Id.  
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raised no danger of corruption.121 Two months later the court 
held unanimously that although the registration, reporting, 
and disclosure requirements could be applied to SpeechNow, it 
would be unconstitutional to apply either FECA’s $5000 per 
calendar year cap on contributions to political committees or 
the statute’s biennial aggregate limit on all contributions to 
committees involved in federal elections.122 
The court determined that, given Citizens United, “the 
analysis is straight-forward . . . . [T]he government has no anti-
corruption interest in limiting independent expenditures.”123 
The FEC argued that, as in McConnell, large contributions to 
groups that aid candidates will make the benefited candidates 
grateful, which can lead to “preferential access for donors and 
undue influence over officeholders.”124 But the court concluded 
that “whatever the merits of those arguments before Citizens 
United, they plainly have no merit after Citizens United.”125 As 
Citizens United held “as a matter of law” that independent ex-
penditures do not corrupt or create the appearance of corrup-
tion, “contributions to groups that make only independent ex-
penditures also cannot corrupt or create the appearance of 
corruption . . . . The Court has effectively held that there is no 
corrupting ‘quid’ for which a candidate might in exchange offer 
a corrupt ‘quo.’”126 As a result, “the government can have no an-
ti-corruption interest in limiting contributions to independent 
expenditure-only organizations.”127 
SpeechNow.org’s reading of Citizens United and its invali-
dation of limits on contributions to independent expenditure-
only committees has since been followed by two other courts of 
appeals. The Ninth Circuit, in two decisions handed down in 
2010 and 2011, addressed provisions of ordinances adopted by 
the cities of Long Beach and San Diego that limited contribu-
tions to committees that independently supported or opposed 
candidates. The Long Beach opinion, handed down just a few 
weeks after SpeechNow.org, was partially empirical.128 Like 
 
 121. Id. at 690.  
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Leake and EMILY’s List, which were cited extensively,129 the 
Long Beach court found that the independent committees in 
question—PACs run by the Long Beach Chamber of Com-
merce—were “several significant steps removed from ‘the case 
in which a donor gives money directly to a candidate,’”130 and 
had no “‘close connection and alignment,’ ‘close affiliation,’ [or] 
‘nexus’ with candidates.”131 As their “relationship with candi-
dates is, at best, attenuated,”132 and as the city had acknowl-
edged that it was unable to “identify a single instance of cor-
ruption, quid pro quo or otherwise, involving contributions to 
[independent expenditure committees] for use as independent 
expenditures,”133 the court held that the contribution limits 
could not be applied to donations to the Long Beach Chamber of 
Commerce PACs.134  
The San Diego decision, handed down a little over a year 
later,135 was more categorical, relying extensively on Citizens 
United’s protection of independent expenditures and its nar-
rowing of McConnell’s definition of corruption.136 Rather than 
emphasize the lack of any evidence of corruption, the court fo-
cused on the lack of any direct tie between the San Diego PACs 
that had challenged the city’s ordinance and municipal candi-
dates as well as the lack of “historical interconnection with 
candidates that distinguishes political parties.”137 
At the close of 2011, in Wisconsin Right to Life State Politi-
cal Action Committee v. Barland, the Seventh Circuit followed 
the District of Columbia and Ninth Circuits in finding that con-
tributions to independent expenditure-only committees may not 
constitutionally be limited.138 The case involved a challenge by 
the Wisconsin Right to Life State Political Action Committee to 
Wisconsin’s relatively high $10,000 per calendar year limit on 
 
didate by any entity that accepted “contribution[s] in excess of $350 to $650, 
depending upon the office for which the candidate is running,” but the court 
treated the restriction as a contribution limit. Id. at 687, 696–99. 
 129. See id. at 687, 692–93, 696–97, 699. 
 130. Id. at 696 (quoting N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 291 
(2008)). 
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 136. Id. at 1118–21. 
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individual donations to state and local candidates, political par-
ties, and political committees.139 The Seventh Circuit treated 
the case as governed entirely by the principles establishing that 
“[t]he threat of quid pro quo corruption does not arise when in-
dependent groups spend money on political speech,” so that it 
followed purely “as a matter of law and logic, that Wisconsin’s 
$10,000 aggregate annual contribution limit is unconstitutional 
as applied to organizations, like the Right to Life PAC, that en-
gage only in independent expenditures.”140 Although the state 
contended that large donations to independent expenditure 
committees can give rise to corruption in indirect ways 
“through the proverbial wink or nod between donor and candi-
date regarding the donor’s uncoordinated beyond-limits contri-
bution,”141 the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument, finding 
that after Citizens United “[a]s a categorical matter,” independ-
ent expenditures “do not give rise to corruption.”142 
SpeechNow.org and the other court of appeals decisions be-
gan the process of dismantling limits on contributions to inde-
pendent expenditure-only committees. The formal authoriza-
tion of Super PACs at the federal level occurred as a result of 
FEC decisions in the summer of 2010. 
E. THE FEC AUTHORIZES FEDERAL SUPER PACS 
Federal Super PACs were officially born when the FEC 
handed down a pair of advisory opinions on July 22, 2010. In 
Club for Growth, Inc., the FEC determined that the Club, an 
ideologically conservative nonprofit 501(c)(4) corporation, could 
create a federally registered independent expenditure-only 
committee, pay for its administrative and solicitation costs, and 
seek unlimited contributions to the committee from the general 
public.143 This represented two departures from the federal 
laws covering political committees. First, a political committee 
established and administered by a corporation—technically, a 
“separate, segregated fund”144—is limited to soliciting contribu-
tions only from people affiliated with the corporation, such as 
stockholders, executive and administrative personnel, employ-
 
 139. Id. at 143. 
 140. Id. at 153–54. 
 141. Id. at 155 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 142. Id. 
 143. FEC Advisory Op. 2010-09, at 3–5 (2010). 
 144. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(A)(i) (2006), declared unconstitutional by Citizen 
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ees, and family members of these groups.145 Second, as already 
noted, FECA limits the amount that can be contributed to a 
corporate PAC. However, citing Citizens United, EMILY’s List, 
and SpeechNow.org, the FEC concluded that as the Club for 
Growth’s proposed committee “intends to make only independ-
ent expenditures, there is no basis to impose contribution limits 
on the Committee” or on its solicitations.146 
The Advisory Opinion noted that the Club for Growth al-
ready had a PAC that made contributions to candidates and 
that the president of the Club, who was treasurer of the exist-
ing PAC, would also serve as treasurer of the new committee.147 
However, given the Club’s representation that the new commit-
tee would not engage in coordinated activity with the candi-
dates it supports, it would still be exempt from FECA’s contri-
bution limits.148 
On the same day, the FEC also advised Commonsense Ten, 
an independent committee newly created to spend inde-
pendently in support of Democratic candidates, that it, too, was 
not subject to FECA’s contribution restrictions on political 
committees.149 Going beyond Club for Growth, Commonsense 
Ten indicated it would solicit and accept unlimited contribu-
tions from corporations, unions, and other political committees, 
as well as individuals.150 Like the Club for Growth committee, 
it would register with the FEC and file regularly scheduled dis-
closure reports.151 The FEC agreed that the committee could 
accept unlimited donations from corporations, unions, and po-
litical committees as well as individuals.152 The Super PAC ca-
pable of both unlimited fundraising for independent expendi-
tures and unlimited independent spending was fully launched. 
In 2011, the FEC dealt with a handful of other Super PAC 
issues that reflected the rapid development of the new cam-
paign finance vehicle. The FEC’s actions and inactions contin-
ued to reshape the legal landscape in ways that encouraged the 
further development of the Super PAC phenomenon. In an ad-
visory opinion issued in June in response to a request from Ma-
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jority PAC (the successor to Commonsense Ten) and House Ma-
jority PAC (two committees formed to engage in independent 
spending in support of democratic congressional candidates), 
the FEC determined that federal officeholders and candidates, 
and national party officials could “attend, speak at, or be fea-
tured . . . fundraisers” at Super PAC events at which donations 
in unlimited amounts were solicited from individuals, corpora-
tions, and unions.153 The only restriction the FEC applied to 
fundraising by federal candidates and party officials is that 
they could not actually ask for more than $5000.154 As part of 
BCRA’s soft-money restrictions, Congress had barred federal 
candidates, federal officials, and national party officials from 
raising any funds that did not comply with federal dollar limits 
and source restrictions.155 These provisions had been specifical-
ly upheld in McConnell and were not specifically challenged in 
Citizens United or SpeechNow.org.156 As a result, dollar limits 
and source restrictions continue to apply to the amounts a fed-
eral candidate, a federal official, or a party official can ask for 
and which entities they can solicit.157 But there are no re-
strictions on the ability of a candidate to appear at a fundraiser 
for and urge donations to a Super PAC intending to use those 
funds to support that candidate or attack her opponent.158 
Subsequently, as a result of a federal district court deci-
sion, the FEC agreed that a formally separate committee was 
not necessary for a PAC to enjoy Super PAC status. In Carey v. 
FEC, the federal district court for the District of Columbia held 
that the National Defense Political Action Committee, a politi-
cal committee not connected to any other organization, could 
make contributions, engage in independent spending, and ac-
cept unlimited contributions for its independent expendi-
tures.159 The Committee could do so provided it maintained 
separate “hard-money” and “soft-money” bank accounts, with a 
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proper allocation of administrative costs between them.160 The 
court issued a preliminary injunction barring the FEC from en-
forcing FECA’s contribution limits with respect to the inde-
pendent expenditures of such a “hybrid PAC.”161 The FEC sub-
sequently stated it would no longer enforce any statutory or 
regulatory provisions barring corporate, union, or unlimited in-
dividual contributions to the “non-contribution account,” that 
is, the independent expenditure accounts of such committees.162 
Carey is flatly inconsistent with CalMed, including Justice 
Blackmun’s concurring opinion, as the National Defense PAC, 
like the CalMed PAC, intended to make both contributions to 
federal candidates and express advocacy independent expendi-
tures concerning them. The district court, however, did not re-
fer to CalMed, let alone attempt to distinguish it. Instead, it 
concluded that the result was required by EMILY’s List, 
SpeechNow.org, and Citizens United.163 Of course, given that 
Club for Growth had previously upheld the ability of one organ-
ization to maintain both a PAC and a Super PAC with the 
same person as treasurer for both entities,164 the practical con-
sequence of permitting one entity with two bank accounts to do 
the same thing may not be significant. Still, the court’s easy as-
sumption that the arrangement now must be constitutional is 
striking and is further evidence of the impact of Citizens United. 
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Attorny for D.B. [sic] Capital Strategies (Mar. 1, 2012), available at 
http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/AO%20201201.Close%20Out%20Letter.pdf (not-
ing in the matter of Stop This Insanity, Inc., AOR 2012-01, draft advisory 
opinion A, to permit a separate segregated fund to operate as a hybrid PAC, 
failed by a vote of 3-3, and draft advisory opinion B, to bar a separate segre-
gated fund from operating as a hybrid PAC, failed by a 3-3 vote). 
By mid-February 2012, there were approximately two dozen hybrid PACs. 
See Dave Levinthal, Hybrid PACs Pick Up Pace, POLITICO (Feb. 14, 2012, 1:20 
PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/72849.html.  
 163. See Carey, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 128–36. 
 164. See FEC Advisory Op. 2010-09, at 4 (2010). 
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At the close of 2011, the FEC grappled with two advisory 
opinion requests that, even more than the fundraising solicita-
tion issue raised in Majority Ten and House Majority Ten, 
demonstrate how closely tied Super PACs have become to spe-
cific candidates. On December 1, the FEC deadlocked over a 
question raised by American Crossroads—which was, by far, 
the Super PAC that raised and spent the most money in 
2010165—regarding whether it could produce and distribute 
broadcast ads that would feature incumbent members of Con-
gress up for reelection, speaking on camera (or in voice over) 
and discussing a legislative or policy issue in a manner “the-
matically similar to the incumbent Members’ own re-election 
campaign materials,” and “us[ing] phrases or slogans that the 
Member has previously used,” with the goal of “improv[ing] the 
public’s perception of the featured Member of Congress in ad-
vance of the 2012 campaign season.”166 Some of these ads might 
also feature criticism of the candidate’s electoral opponents.167 
American Crossroads candidly stated all the advertisements 
would be “fully coordinated” with the candidates so aided “inso-
far as each Member would be consulted on the advertisement 
script and would then appear in the advertisement” but also 
asserted the ads would not contain any “express advocacy or 
the functional equivalent of express advocacy.”168 Three com-
missioners concluded that American Crossroads’ frank 
acknowledgement that its advertising program would be “fully 
coordinated [with the candidates]” whose reelection the organi-
zation sought to promote meant the ads were effectively contri-
butions within the meaning of FECA169 so that they could not 
be paid for by an independent expenditure-only committee.170 
But three other commissioners found that the proposed ads 
were not “coordinated expenditures” within the meaning of 
FEC regulations even if they were coordinated-in-fact with 
 
 165. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Super PACs, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Mar. 5, 
2012) [hereinafter Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Super PACs], http://www 
.opensecrets.org/pacs/superpacs.php?cycle=2010. 
 166. FEC Advisory Op. 2011-23, at 1 (2011) (request for advisory opinion by 
American Crossroads).  
 167. Id. 
 168. Id.  
 169. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(8)(A)(1), 441a(a)(7)(B) (2006), declared unconstitu-
tional by SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 559 F.3d 686, 688 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 170. FEC Advisory Op. 2011-23, at 2 (2011) (vote); FEC Advisory Op. 2011-
23, at 3, 7–8 (2011) (agenda document No. 11-68-A).  
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candidates.171 The FEC regulation defining “coordinated ex-
penditure” requires consideration of the content of the ads as 
well as the relationship between the sponsor and the candidate 
aided by the ad.172 It exempts from a finding of coordination 
ads that avoided express advocacy or the functional equivalent 
of express advocacy concerning candidates, even if decisions 
concerning whether and where to air the ad and determining 
its content are actually coordinated between the candidate and 
the ostensibly independent committee.173 Moreover, the com-
missioners willing to permit the Super PAC to air coordinated-
in-fact ads reasoned that “there are many reasons why candi-
dates can and should work with outside groups on important 
issues or legislation.”174 Although the deadlock meant the 
Commission could not green light American Crossroads’ pro-
posal, the three votes in favor of the Super PAC’s position 
strongly suggest that the FEC is highly unlikely to bring an en-
forcement action against American Crossroads if it undertakes 
the projected ad campaign. 
Finally, also at the end of the year, the FEC did impose one 
check on a planned Super PAC. Utah Republican Senator Mi-
chael Shumway Lee sought permission to create an independ-
ent spending account within his leadership PAC, the Constitu-
tional Conservatives Fund PAC.175 He also sought permission 
to solicit unlimited contributions to an account to be used to 
pay for ads expressly calling for the election or defeat of clearly 
identified federal candidatesother than Senator Lee him-
self.176 A leadership PAC is a committee “directly or indirectly 
established, financed, maintained or controlled” by a federal of-
ficial or candidate for federal office but is not the candidate’s 
authorized campaign committee.177 Federal candidates and of-
ficeholders use leadership PACs to assist other candidates, 
such as fellow party members, in their campaigns or to pay for 
non-election-related political expenses of the PAC’s sponsor.178 
 
 171. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21 (2011). 
 172. See id. § 109.21(a), (c). 
 173. See id.  
 174. FEC Advisory Op. 2011-23, at 2 (agenda document No. 11-68-A) 
(statement of Vice Chair Caroline C. Hunter and Commissioners Donald F. 
McGahn and Matthew S. Petersen). 
 175. FEC Advisory Op. 2011-21, at 1 (2011) (Request by Constitutional 
Conservatives Fund PAC). 
 176. Id.  
 177. 2 U.S.C. § 434(i)(8)(B) (2006). 
 178. See, e.g., FEC Advisory Op. 2011-21, at 1–2. 
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Senator Lee contended that his leadership PAC, like any other 
PAC, could engage in unlimited independent spending on be-
half of federal candidates without raising the danger of corrup-
tion, so that he too should be able to accept unlimited contribu-
tions into the independent spending account of his leadership 
PAC.179 Whatever the logic of his argument in light of Citizens 
United, EMILY’s List, and SpeechNow.org, however, the Com-
mission concluded that this issue, much like the solicitation of 
contributions by federal candidates and officials considered in 
Majority PAC and House Majority PAC, was resolved by the 
BCRA provision,180 sustained in McConnell, and not challenged 
by any later court decision, barring federal candidates and offi-
cials from soliciting, receiving, directing, transferring, or spend-
ing election funds that do not comply with federal contribution 
limits and source prohibitions.181 
The Constitutional Conservatives Fund decision was only a 
relatively minor check on the expansive legal development of 
Super PACs. At the start of the spring of 2010, Super PACs did 
not exist. By the close of the fall of 2011, through a combination 
of court decisions and FEC advisory opinions and non-
decisions, these new campaign finance instruments could raise 
and spend unlimited funds provided by individuals, corpora-
tions, and unions; use the very candidates they supported to 
fundraise for them; make contributions to candidates (albeit 
only with hard-money funds), as well as aid them with inde-
pendent expenditures; and, given the deadlocked response to 
the American Crossroads advisory opinion request, probably 
collaborate with candidates in preparing campaign ads that use 
footage of the candidates and sound the candidates’ own 
themes, provided they avoid express advocacy or the functional 
equivalent of express advocacy in those ads. Moreover, as the 
progression of cases indicates, Super PACs have very quickly 
evolved from truly independent committees devoted to ideologi-
cal causes, like the right to life organizations in Leake, the 
chamber of commerce in Long Beach, and the ideological con-
servatives in Club for Growth, to the more plainly partisan 
committees in Commonsense Ten, and organizations working 
very closely with specific candidates as in Majority Ten and 
 
 179. See id.  
 180. 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e)(1). 
 181. Letter from Cynthia L. Bauerly, Chair, FEC, to Dan Backer, Attorney 
for DB Capitol Strategies, PLLC (Dec. 1, 2011), available at http://saos.nictusa 
.com/saos/searchao? SUBMIT= ao&AO=3349. 
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House Majority Ten and American Crossroads. As the discus-
sion in the next Part indicates, by late 2011 and early 2012 
many Super PACs were created to aid specific candidates and 
were effectively part of the campaigns of the candidates they 
aided. As such, their rise appears to signal the end of the mod-
ern effort to limit the size and source of contributions to  
candidates. 
III.  SUPER PACS ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL   
A. 2010 
Super PACs were not officially recognized by the FEC until 
late July 2010, but they got off to a very fast start. By the end 
of the 2010 congressional elections less than four months later, 
eighty-four groups had registered with the FEC as Super 
PACs.182 These groups reported raising nearly $85 million and 
spending just over $65 million on independent expenditures 
expressly supporting or opposing federal candidates.183 Alt-
hough less than a quarter of the more than $290 million spent 
by all outside groups on independent expenditures and elec-
tioneering communications in the 2009–2010 election cycle,184 
this amount was still a substantial development, especially giv-
en the short period of time in which Super PACs could operate. 
In effect, the Super PACs were raising an average of roughly $5 
million a week during the period they were active. Super PACs 
reported making expenditures of at least $250,000 in 111 dif-
ferent House and Senate races and spending at least a half mil-
lion dollars in each of twenty-five contests.185 Super PAC inde-
pendent spending was equal to twenty percent or more of total 
candidate spending in four elections.186 In the hotly contested 
Colorado Senate race, Super PACs spent more than $10 mil-
lionmore than forty percentof the total amount spent by 
the competing Republican and Democratic candidates.187  
Although those potential donors who prize anonymity may 
prefer to give to 501(c) organizations not subject to public dis-
closure, Super PACs also enjoy certain fundraising advantages. 
 
 182. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Super PACs, supra note 165.  
 183. Id. 
 184. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/ ( last visited Jan. 25, 2012).  
 185. GARRETT, supra note 2, at 17.  
 186. Id. at 18. 
 187. Id.  
 2012] SUPER PACS 1673 
 
Not only are they free to expressly advocate for and against 
candidates, but they need not veil their fundraising appeals in 
the language of issue advocacy. As David Keating, the execu-
tive director of Club for Growth, explained to the Washington 
Post, fund-raising appeals for issue advocacy groups “were 
awkward and forced the organizations to be vague about their 
intentions.”188 In his words, “[w]hat’s really liberating about 
this particular type of organization is that you can actually talk 
to people honestly about what you want to do . . . . Raising 
money is also a lot easier and more on the up-and-up for every-
one involved.”189 
Of the more than eighty Super PACs active in 2010, ten ac-
counted for almost seventy five percent of total Super PAC 
campaign spending, with American Crossroads towering over 
the entire field.190 Founded in part by President George W. 
Bush’s chief political adviser Karl Rove,191 American Cross-
roads raised more than $26 million and spent more than $21 
million on independent expenditures, or about a third of total 
Super PAC campaign spending in 2010.192 American Cross-
roads spent nearly $6 million in the Colorado Senate race, $2.7 
million in the Missouri Senate race (out of $3.3 million spent by 
all Super PACs in that contest), and more than $2 million in 
the Florida Senate election.193 All of American Crossroads’ 
spending was either for the Republican candidate or, as with 
the $5.1 million in negative ads aimed at Colorado’s Democratic 
Senator Michael Bennet, against Democrats.194 In general, Su-
per PAC spending tended to be negative.195 Whereas independ-
ent spending by traditional PACs in 2010 consisted of $48 mil-
lion in positive ads and $20 million in negative ads, three-
 
 188. Dan Eggen & T.W. Farnam, ‘Super PACs’ Alter Campaign, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 28, 2010, at A6. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See GARRETT, supra note 2, at 12–13. 
 191. See Dave Cook, Karl Rove ‘Super PAC’ Won’t Favor Any 2012 Candi-
date During Primaries, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 24, 2011), http://www 
.csmonitor.com/USA/politics/mintor_breakfast/2011/0624/Karl-Rove-super-PAC 
-won-t-favor-any-2012-canddiate-during-primaries. 
 192. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2010 Outside Spending, supra note 2.  
 193. See GARRETT, supra note 2, at 18; Ctr. for Responsive Politics, American 
Crossroads Independent Expenditures, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Jan. 27, 2011), 
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/indexpend.php?strID=C00487363&cycle=2010. 
 194. See FEC, 2010 FALL ELECTION CYCLE SUMMARY DATA TABLE 3: SUM-
MARY OF INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES (2010), available at http://www.fec 
.gov/press/bkgnd/cf.summary.info/2010pac_fullsum/3indepexp2010.pdf. 
 195. Id. 
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quarters of Super PAC independent expenditures were for neg-
ative ads.196  
Perhaps most striking given the role Citizens United 
played in mid-wifing the birth of Super PACs, corporate contri-
butions amounted to only a modest share of Super PAC 
fundsapproximately twenty-three percent.197 Although news 
accounts noted the $1 million donation American Crossroads 
received from Dixie Rice Agricultural Corp.,198 other stories re-
ported on the multi-hundred-thousand and multi-million dollar 
gifts to Super PACs from very wealthy individuals, including 
$7 million to American Crossroads from Texas magnate Bob J. 
Perry, who had been a prime financial backer of the anti-Kerry 
527 committee Swift Boat Veterans for Truth in 2004.199 In 
general, more of the money given to Super PACs seems to have 
come from “private-equity partners and hedge fund manag-
ers,”200 and corporate executives and owners than from the cor-
porate treasury funds unleashed by Citizens United. Citizens 
United may have drawn public attention and concern because 
of its validation of corporate campaign spending; but in the 
short run at least its principal consequence appears to have 
been to make it easier for very wealthy individuals who had al-
ready been free to spend independently to pool their funds and 
give them to organizations run by expert political operatives for 
use in election campaigns. 
B. 2011 AND THE START OF 2012 
Early indications are that 2010 was just a warm-up elec-
tion for Super PACs and that their real impact will be in 2012. 
Even before the end of 2011, 258 groups had registered as Su-
per PACs with the FEC—three times the number active in 
2010—and they had reported receiving $32 million and spend-
 
 196. Id. 
 197. See Diana Dwyre, After Citizens United and SpeechNow.org: Consider-
ing the Consequences of New Campaign Finance Rules 13–14 (Sept. 1–4, 
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1901547. 
 198. Jonathan D. Salant & Kristin Jensen, ‘Super PACs’ Multiply to Sway 
Election, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Sept. 9, 2010, 9:53 AM), http:// 
businessweek.com/busdaily/dnflash/content/Sep2010.db2010099_789434.htm. 
 199. Jim Kuhnhenn, Texas Millionaire Gives $7 Million to GOP Group, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 20, 2010, at A4. 
 200. T.W. Farnam, 72 Super PACs Spent $83.7 Million on Election, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 4, 2010, at A3. 
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ing $11 million.201 By early April 2012, the number of Super 
PACs had risen to 421, and they reported raising more than 
$155 million and spending nearly $90 million.202 
More striking even than the explosive growth in the num-
ber of Super PACs has been their change in focus. In 2010, the 
Super PACs that spent the most money—including American 
Crossroads, America’s Families First Action Fund, Club for 
Growth Action, NEA Action, Women Vote!, and Commonsense 
Ten—were broadly ideological, partisan, or connected to tradi-
tional interest groups like unions, trade associations, or envi-
ronmentalists.203 Some, most prominently American Cross-
roads, were tightly linked to a particular party, but none were 
focused on a specific candidate or sponsored by a particular 
party leader.204 That changed in 2011 and 2012. With the ex-
ception of American Crossroads, the leading Super PACs in the 
opening phase of the 2011–2012 election cycle were all orga-
nized to back a specific candidate or were formed at the behest 
of party leaders.205  
The leading Super PAC, in terms of receipts and expendi-
tures, was Restore Our Future; it was organized by Governor 
Mitt Romney’s 2008 campaign treasurer and political director, 
who was joined in the summer of 2011 by the Romney cam-
paign’s chief fundraiser.206 Restore Our Future reported re-
ceipts of more than $43 million as of early April 2012, and ex-
penditures of more than $40 million.207 According to news 
accounts, it had spent $5 million even before the New Hamp-
shire primary.208 The Super PAC Make Us Great Again was 
founded by Governor Rick Perry’s former chief of staff shortly 
 
 201. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Super PACs, supra note 165.  
 202. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2012 Outside Spending, by Super 
PACs, OPENSECRETS.ORG [hereinafter Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Super 
PACs April 2012], http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/sum.php?cycle= 
2012&chrt=V&type=S ( last visited Apr. 11, 2012). 
 203. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Super PACs, supra note 165.  
 204. See id. 
 205. See id.  
 206. Michael Scherer, How Super PACs Could Eclipse Official Campaigns in 
2012, TIME (Sept. 19, 2011), http://swampland.time.com/2011/09/19/how-super 
-pacs-could-eclipse-official-campaigns-in-2012/; Romney Fundraiser Jumps From 
Campaign to Super PAC, IWATCHNEWS (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www 
.iwatchnews.org/2011/08/24/5941/romney-fundraiser-jumps-campaign-super-pac. 
 207. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Super PACs April 2012, supra note 
202. 
 208. T.W. Farnam, Super PACs Let Big Donors Give Even More to Their 
Candidates, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2012, at A1. 
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before the governor declared his candidacy for the Republican 
presidential nomination209 and was one of nine Super PACs 
supporting Perry.210 It had spent $3.8 million by the start of 
2012.211 An executive of the Huntsman Corporation—the family 
business that is the source of Utah Governor John Huntsman’s 
personal wealth—filed the papers forming the Our Destiny 
PAC.212 Our Destiny received much of its funding from Gover-
nor Huntsman’s father, “a billionaire chemical executive,” and 
financed a major advertising campaign to support Huntsman’s 
New Hampshire primary effort.213 Our Destiny had spent more 
than $2.8 million by the day Governor Huntsman ended his 
campaign.214 By April 2012, Winning Our Future, the Super 
PAC created to back former Speaker of the House Newt Gin-
grich,215 had raised nearly $19 million and spent nearly $17 
million.216 The pro-Rick Santorum Red White and Blue Fund 
had spent nearly $7.5 million by the time he ended his cam-
paign.217 President Obama was the sole intended beneficiary of 
the Priorities USA PAC, which was founded by two former 
White House aides.218 Other Super PACs were formed to back 
Ron Paul, Newt Gingrich, Herman Cain, and Michele Bach-
man.219 As one Republican operative presciently forecasted ear-
ly in the campaign season, in addition to a candidate’s author-
 
 209. See Nicholas Confessore, Lines Blur Between Candidates and PACs 
with Unlimited Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2011, at A1. 
 210. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Super PACs, supra note 165.  
 211. See Farnam, supra note 208. 
 212. See Alexander Burns, Huntsman Corporation Insider Launches PAC, 
POLITICO (Aug. 29, 2011, 3:09 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0811/ 
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 213. See Jim Rutenberg, Huntsman Campaign, Low on Cash, Gets Aid 
From Group Tied to Father, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2011, at A24; Jim Rutenberg 
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202. 
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 216. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Super PACs April 2012, supra note 
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 218. See Matea Gold & Christi Parsons, Former Obama Aides May Start 
Political Group, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2011, at A9. 
 219. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Super PACs, supra note 165. 
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ized campaign committee “everybody will have a [Super PAC]—
there will be a sidecar for every motorcycle.”220 
Nor were presidential candidates the only election partici-
pants to be benefited, or challenged, by highly targeted Super 
PACs. The congressional leadership of both parties organized 
and solicited funds for Super PACs aimed at electing or reelect-
ing members of Congress.221 In the House, for example, a for-
mer top aide to Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R.-Va.) started 
the YG (for “Young Guns”) Action Fund with the goal of raising 
and spending $30 million to help the Republicans retain control 
of the House in the fall of 2012.222 Other members of Congress 
and ideological groups have also been active in creating or us-
ing Super PACs for Congressional races.223 Candidate-specific 
Super PACs have been created to back Senator Orrin Hatch 
(R.-Utah) and Rep. Howard Berman (D.-Cal.), and to oppose 
Senators Scott Brown (R.-Mass.), Sherrod Brown (D.-Ohio), and 
Thomas Carper (D.-Del.).224 By early January 2012, Super 
PACs were already looming so large in the Massachusetts Sen-
ate race that Senator Brown and his prospective Democratic 
opponent Elizabeth Warren were discussing ways of limiting 
their role.225 One seasoned Capitol Hill observer predicted that 
“[i]t’s only a matter of time before super PACs become, 
like . . . leadership PACs de rigueur for Members of the House 
and Senate.”226 
 
 220. Melanie Mason, Jon Huntsman Latest Hopeful to Be Backed by ‘Super 
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With no limits on the donations it can accept, a Super PAC 
focused on a specific candidate is the perfect vehicle for donors 
who want to support the candidate, but who have “maxed out,” 
that is, have hit the statutory ceiling on how much they can 
contribute to the candidate’s authorized campaign committee. 
One study found that of the 205 individuals who donated to the 
pro-Romney Restore Our Future Super PAC in 2011, 172 indi-
viduals, or eighty-four percent of the total, had also contributed 
the maximum amount allowed by law to Romney’s campaign.227 
Five of these “maxed out” donors each gave $1 million to Re-
store Our Future.228 Similarly, more than one-quarter of the 
donors to the pro-Obama Super PAC, Priorities USA Action, 
had also maxed out on their donations to the President’s cam-
paign committee, as had three-quarters of the donors to the 
pro-Rick Perry Make Us Great Again, more than half the do-
nors to Rick Santorum’s Red White and Blue Fund, and almost 
one-third of the donors to Newt Gingrich’s Winning the  
Future.229  
Most of these donations were extremely large. As of the 
end of February 2012, two-thirds of all donations to Super 
PACs consisted of contributions of $500,000 or more.230 The top 
ten Super PAC donors had all given in excess of $2 million 
apiece, with casino magnate Sheldon Adelson, his wife, and 
family leading the pack with $16.5 million in contributions to 
the pro-Gingrich Super PAC, Winning the Future; financier 
Harold Simmons not far behind with $15.4 million in donations 
from himself, his wife, and their company to pro-Romney, pro-
Gingrich, and pro-Santorum Super PACs; and Texas home-
builder Bob Perry had given $6.66 million to the pro-Romney 
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Super PAC Restore Our Future, a pro-Rick Perry Super PAC, 
and Super PAC American Crossroads.231 
The many candidate-specific Super PACs that emerged in 
2011–2012 played a central financing role in the opening 
rounds of the Republican presidential contest. Some Super 
PACs apparently “spent more ad money than the candidates 
they support.”232 According to news accounts, by mid-December 
2011 Restore Our Future had spent $2.6 million in Iowa, much 
of it on negative ads aimed at New Gingrich.233 The pro-Perry 
Super PAC, Make Us Great Again, spent nearly $2.5 million in 
the fall of 2011, while the pro-Huntsman Super PAC, Our Des-
tiny, spent nearly $1.9 million,234 primarily on ads in New 
Hampshire235 “even as the Huntsman campaign . . . remained 
off the air.”236 Overall, Super PACs, dominated by those back-
ing Mitt Romney, Rick Perry, and Jon Huntsman spent more 
than $15 million by early January 2012,237 with roughly two-
thirds of Romney’s spending in Iowa238 and South Carolina239 
coming from his Super PAC. In the run up to Super Tuesday, 
Mitt Romney’s campaign focused all its broadcast ad spending 
on Ohio, but his Super PAC spent $7 million on “broadcast tel-
evision, cable, and radio . . . blanketing the airwaves from Ida-
ho to Georgia.”240 Similarly, Newt Gingrich ran no ads of his 
own, but the Super PAC supporting him spent $3.7 million in 
seven states.241 According to one survey, Super PACs accounted 
for ninety-one percent of the campaign ads broadcast in connec-
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tion with the Alabama and Mississippi Republican presidential 
primaries.242  
During the most intense phase of the Republican nominat-
ing contest, news accounts repeatedly found that Super PAC 
spending was comparable to, if not greater than, spending by 
the candidates’ own campaign committees.243 By early April 
2012, Restore Our Future had spent more than $40 million, or 
roughly two-thirds of what the Romney campaign had spent as 
of the end of February.244 Winning Our Future had spent $16.7 
million, or nearly the $19.2 million spent by the Gingrich cam-
paign itself as of the end of February 2012, and the pro-
Santorum Red, White & Blue Fund had spent $7.5 million, 
compared to the $13 million spent by the Santorum campaign 
proper, as of the end of February 2012.245 As in 2010, Super 
PAC ads tended to be predominantly negative, as illustrated by 
the anti-Gingrich ads aired in Iowa by Restore Our Future and 
by the pro-Santorum Super PAC, Red, White & Blue Fund.246  
To be sure, in order to receive unlimited contributions, Su-
per PACs must operate technically independently of the candi-
dates they support.247 Indeed, in a television interview in De-
cember 2011, Governor Romney, who was the intended 
beneficiary of more Super PAC spending than any other candi-
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date, bemoaned the anti-coordination rule.248 Calling Super 
PACs “a disaster,” he stressed in response to a complaint about 
Restore Our Future’s negative anti-Gingrich ads, “I’m not al-
lowed to communicate with a Super PAC in any way, shape or 
form. If we coordinate in any way whatsoever, we go to the big 
house.”249  
However, a candidate and the candidate-specific Super 
PAC supporting the candidate can establish a successful work-
ing relationship without formal coordination. The candidate 
can fundraise for the Super PAC250 and the Super PAC can run 
footage of the candidate in its ads. Indeed, one candidate, Rick 
Perry, used footage from his Super PAC’s ad for his own cam-
paign ads.251 Candidates and committees can post their plans 
on Internet websites, thereby effectively sharing strategies 
with each other.252 Indeed, candidates and Super PACs may 
turn to the same consultants for advice on direct mail strate-
gies, voter research, polling, and media services.253 Surrogates 
for the presidential candidate can meet with the staff of and 
donors to the Super PAC.254 Foster Friess, the top financial 
backer of the pro-Santorum Red, White & Blue Fund shared 
the stage with Santorum when he gave his victory speech after 
winning an election contest in Missouri.255 More generally, as 
Super PACs are typically run by former top aides to the candi-
dates, formal coordination of message or strategies between 
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candidates and their Super PACs is unnecessary. The two 
committees are likely to share common understandings of cam-
paign themes and campaign tactics. As Tom Cole (R.-Okla.), the 
former chair of the National Republican Campaign Commit-
tee—the official campaign committee of House Republicans—
explained, “‘[w]hen your old consultants and your best buddies 
are setting them up, you can pretty much suspect that there’s 
been a lot of discussion beforehand.’”256 Or, as one former FEC 
commissioner put it, “[p]eople who think alike don’t need to 
conspire.”257 
IV.  SUPER PACS AND THE FUTURE OF CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE LAW   
As this Article is going to press in the spring of 2012, it is 
too early to determine for certain what impact Super PACs will 
have on campaign finance in the 2012 election, let alone in the 
elections to follow. However, the preliminary data indicates 
that Super PACs are likely to be transformative, effectively 
ending the post-Watergate era of campaign finance laws.  
As enacted by Congress in the FECA Amendments of 1974 
and substantially modified by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. 
Valeo, the post-Watergate campaign finance regime had three 
basic features: (1) limits on contributions to federal candidates, 
to the political parties, and to political committees focused on 
federal elections; (2) reporting and disclosure of contributions 
to and by, and expenditures by, these regulated entities; and (3) 
partial public funding of presidential candidates.258 The contri-
bution limits sought to curtail the influence of very wealthy do-
nors, and also continued the preexisting prohibitions on corpo-
rate and union contributions.259 The expenditure limits on 
independent spending would have curtailed circumvention of 
the contribution limits to candidates,260 while the spending lim-
its on candidates would have reduced the incentive for them to 
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focus on fundraising.261 The disclosure requirements were 
aimed at fully informing the voters concerning the individuals 
and interests that were funding campaigns.262 Public funding 
was intended to alleviate the fund-raising burden for presiden-
tial candidates while also reducing their dependence on large 
private contributions.263 
Due to the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the expenditure 
limits Congress adopted for candidates and independent com-
mittees, FECA’s contribution limits were subject to strain from 
the outset. Candidates scrambled to collect the limited dona-
tions required to fund the unlimited spending the Supreme 
Court permitted. The combination of unlimited spending and 
limited contributions benefited multi-millionaire candidates 
and provided an opportunity for fundraising intermediaries, 
such as PACs and bundlers, to aid candidates. Independent 
committees also offered an important alternative for donors 
subject to contribution limits to provide additional financial 
support for their preferred candidates and to attempt to influ-
ence electoral outcomes. The system, strained as it was, largely 
held. In the 1990s through the early 2000s, the system almost 
broke as soft-money contributions to the political parties evad-
ed statutory dollar limits and source prohibitions, and both 
party-funded and outside group issue ads provided new oppor-
tunities for very wealthy donors, corporations, and unions to 
pump money into the system.264 But the soft-money and elec-
tioneering communications provisions of BCRA, as sustained by 
the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC, to a considerable de-
gree restored the post-Watergate era campaign finance struc-
ture. Although outside groups like 527s and 501(c)s played a 
role in the 2004 and 2006 elections, they were still relatively 
peripheral, and the possibility of new rules addressing those 
organizations was under active consideration in both Congress 
and the FEC.265 The 2008 presidential election largely abided 
by the post-Watergate rules, supplemented by BCRA. 
That system has now begun to come apart. The Supreme 
Court initiated the process in 2007 when its decision in FEC v. 
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Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL)266 effectively eviscerated 
BCRA’s restrictions on electioneering communications by non-
party outside groups, including corporations and labor un-
ions.267 Indeed, much of the work of unleashing the potential 
for unrestricted corporate and union spending was actually ac-
complished by WRTL, not Citizens United. After WRTL, corpo-
rations, unions, and outside groups could spend whatever they 
wanted on elections, provided they avoided express advocacy, or 
the functional equivalent of express advocacy. However, that 
requirement still created some uncertainty. Moreover, although 
wealthy individuals could spend as much as they wanted on in-
dependent spending individually, if they sought to pool their 
funds to enhance their impact and to engage in express advoca-
cy they were still blocked by FECA’s limits on contributions to 
political committees.268 Citizens United directly eliminated any 
remaining uncertainty about the legality of corporate campaign 
spending, and indirectly, but at least as significantly, contrib-
uted to the decisions of the lower courts and the FEC to elimi-
nate the barriers to unlimited donations to political committees 
that engage in express advocacy. It is possible, given Leake, 
EMILY’s List, and Justice Blackmun’s CalMed concurrence 
that that barrier would have come down anyway. But Citizens 
United provided an impetus that led to its immediate  
dismantling. 
Citizens United left the monetary and source limits on con-
tributions to candidates and political parties formally intact, 
but the rise of Super PACs has rendered them functionally 
meaningless. Any individual who has “maxed out” on a contri-
bution to a candidate or party, or any corporation or union 
barred from giving to a candidate or party, can give without 
limit to the candidate’s designated Super PAC, to one of the 
large Super PACs dedicated to advancing the fortunes of a spe-
cific party, or to one of the Super PACs organized by the Repub-
lican or Democratic leaders of the House or Senate.269 In Au-
gust 2011, Sheldon Adelson and his wife Miriam each gave the 
Gingrich campaign for the Republican presidential nomination 
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the maximum $2500 per person federal law permits in individ-
ual donations to candidates.270 Then in January 2012, Mr. 
Adelson gave Winning Our Future, a Super PAC dedicated to 
promoting Gingrich’s nomination campaign, $5 million—or two-
thousand times more than the law allowed him to give the can-
didate. Ultimately, Adelson, his wife, daughters, and one son-
in-law together gave the pro-Gingrich PAC $16.5 million.271 
Multi-hundred-thousand and multi-million dollar donations—
contributions of a size not seen since before the enactment of 
the 1974 campaign finance reforms—are now common.272 As of 
the end of February 2012, more than $100 million in Super 
PAC funds had come from donors of $500,000 or more,273 with 
25 individuals having each donated $1 million or more.274 
Campaign finance observers have noted that with the emergence 
of Super PACs, “you make a phone call and get a million dol-
lars.”275  
Not only are campaign contributions now effectively unre-
stricted in amount, they are also for all practical purposes con-
tributions to the candidates.276 To be sure, these oversized con-
tributions are going to committees that are technically 
independent of the candidates, and are not allowed to coordi-
nate their activities with the candidates.277 But in practice a 
committee is part of the campaign of the candidate it is aid-
ing.278 As already noted, candidates have raised funds for 
“their” Super PACs, have sent their surrogates to meet with the 
Super PACs and their financial supporters, and the Super 
PACs consistently employ former staffers of the candidates 
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they are backing.279 As Mitt Romney pointed out when called 
on to answer for the anti-Gingrich ads aired by Restore Our 
Future during the New Hampshire primary, “of course they’re 
former staff of mine.”280 Moreover, there are all sorts of ways in 
which a candidate and the Super PAC backing him can collabo-
rate without coordinating. They can simply listen to each oth-
er’s press conferences, watch each other’s commercials, and 
check the same publically available poll data and focus group 
results.  
As a result, even without actions that would trigger a find-
ing of coordination, a Super PAC can follow the candidate’s lead 
in deciding what campaign themes to stress or which audiences 
to target. As Rick Tyler, Newt Gingrich’s former spokesman 
and subsequent adviser to Winning Our Future, explained, 
“[w]e’re Newt’s super PAC. We take out [sic] marching orders 
through the media for Newt Gingrich . . . . I do what Newt tells 
me through the media. And it’s all within the confines of the 
law.”281 A spokesman for the Super PAC backing Rick Santo-
rum made the same point, stating that, “[m]ore or less everyone 
is looking at the same numbers . . . . A corollary to that is that 
you can obviously see what the candidate is doing, whether it’s 
on the stump or on the TV.”282 Frequently, a candidate’s ads 
and those of his supportive Super PAC “sound almost exactly 
the same.”283 Indeed, during one of the New Hampshire de-
bates, both Mitt Romney and Newt Gingrich demonstrated 
close familiarity with ads run—and even campaign ads not yet 
aired—by their supportive Super PACs, and defended the con-
tent of the ads these ostensibly independent committees ran 
from charges that the allegations in the ads were untrue or 
misleading.284 Just as the Super PACs are able to follow the 
signals sent by their candidates, the candidates are well aware 
of what their Super PACs are doing, even as the formal inde-
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pendence of candidate and Super PAC enables the candidate to 
distance himself from the most negative Super PAC ads.285 
With the ability to raise and spend unlimited amounts and 
create messages expressly advocating the election or defeat of 
specific candidates, Super PACs are poised to be important 
campaign finance players—if they don’t dominate the system 
outright. Super PAC activity resulted in far more total media 
spending in the early Republican presidential nomination con-
tests compared with four years earlier.286 Often, the Super 
PACs spend more than the candidates they are backing, and 
Super PAC ads can overshadow the campaign ads of their can-
didates. In New Hampshire and South Carolina the Super 
PACs backing Ron Paul and Rick Santorum “seemed to be de-
fining the battlefield for the two candidates.”287 Super PACs 
had a major impact on the unfolding of the campaign, with 
heavy spending by Romney’s Restore Our Future PAC knock-
ing Gingrich out of the polling lead he briefly enjoyed in Iowa, 
while a surge in donations to the pro-Santorum and pro-
Gingrich Super PACs—especially the $5 million Adelson con-
tribution—kept those two candidates in contention in South 
Carolina and after.288 Although the early demise of the Hunts-
man and Perry candidacies demonstrates that even a well-
funded Super PAC is no guarantee of victory, the overall pat-
tern of the Republican nominating contest demonstrates the 
significant role Super PACs played as central vehicles for the 
raising and spending of campaign money.289 
With multi-million dollar contributions from donors who 
maxed out on donations to candidates, de facto collaboration 
with candidates, ads that echo the candidates’ own ads, and a 
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volume of money that outpaces the candidates, the age of Super 
PACs has arrived. Super PACs have shattered the contribution 
limits that have been central to the campaign finance regime 
created by FECA, sustained in significant part by Buckley, and 
reinforced by BCRA. The other two elements of the 
FECA/Buckley system—disclosure and public funding——
remain legally sound, but practically weak.  
In Citizens United290 and Doe v. Reed,291 the Supreme 
Court resoundingly endorsed disclosure.292 Citizens United, in 
particular, treated disclosure as the constitutionally preferred 
form of campaign finance regulation.293 However, the statutes 
and regulations requiring disclosure will have to be significant-
ly updated to reflect both Citizens United and the new candi-
date-specific Super PACs.294 For example, reporting schedules 
will have to be revised to deal with the surge of Super PAC ac-
tivity in pre-election years and in connection with early caucus-
es and primaries,295 and greater disclosure of the network of re-
lationships linking Super PACs to 527s and 501(c) 
organizations is necessary.296 Moreover, Citizens United and 
Commonsense Ten, by making it possible for corporations to 
give to Super PACs, have also opened up a new means for do-
nors to evade disclosure.297 If a corporation gives to a trade as-
sociation, which in turn contributes to a Super PAC, the Super 
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PAC must report the trade association’s donation, but the 
sources of the trade association’s funds need not be reported.298  
Additionally, an individual can create a shell corporation, 
and contribute to the shell, which in turn contributes to the 
Super PAC.299 The donation from the shell corporation will be 
reported, but not the underlying individual donor.300 The possi-
bility of such a tactic was underscored in August 2011 when re-
porters noted that the Romney Super PAC, Restore Our Fu-
ture, had received a $1 million donation from “W Spann LLC,” 
a Delaware corporation with a Manhattan address that had 
been formed in March, made its contribution in April, and dis-
solved in July, with no apparent activity other than the dona-
tion to Restore Our Future.301 To tamp down the resulting con-
troversy, the anonymous donor—a former official at the 
investment firm Romney once headed—soon came forward.302 
But that is unlikely to be the last time such a device is used to 
avoid disclosure. Indeed, Super PACs have continued to report 
donations from such cryptic backers as F8 LLC303 and RTTA 
LLC.304 The comedian Stephen Colbert, who had already creat-
ed his own Super PAC to draw attention to the Super PAC 
phenomenon,305 announced he would form a shell corporation—
appropriately named “Anonymous Shell Corporation”—to pro-
vide his donors with the same opportunity.306 
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Thus, disclosure laws will require significant revision to 
deal with the rise of Super PACs.307 And, of course, even if ef-
fectively so revised, disclosure can do nothing to limit large do-
nations to and spending by Super PACs. 
Although last year’s decision in Arizona Free Enterprise 
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett308 will make it more diffi-
cult to develop mechanisms that enable publicly funded candi-
dates to compete with privately funded ones or—and this is 
more salient given the rise of Super PACs—to respond to hos-
tile independent spending, public funding still remains a con-
stitutionally viable form of campaign finance regulation.309 The 
real difficulty for public funding, particularly at the federal lev-
el, is the unwillingness of legislators to offer public funds at 
high enough levels to make public funding attractive to serious 
candidates, as well as the failure to revise the presidential pub-
lic funding program to take into account the fact that the initial 
caucuses and primaries of the nomination campaign now start 
much earlier than they did when public funding was first en-
acted.310 As a result of the weaknesses of the public funding 
program, 2012 marks the first election since the enactment of 
the presidential public funding program in 1974 in which not a 
single serious presidential candidate is taking public fund-
ing.311 Given that the House of Representatives voted in 2011 
to abolish public funding for presidential campaigns,312 it seems 
extremely unlikely that Congress will do anything to strength-
en public funding in practice, even though it remains constitu-
tionally available in theory.  
 
 307. For some proposed reforms to our disclosure laws that address the rise 
of Super PACs and other forms of independent spending, see Briffault, supra 
note 294, (manuscript at 10–38).  
 308. 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011) (holding that Arizona’s matching funds 
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Representatives voted 235 to 190 to end the funding, although the matter is 
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Contribution limits to candidates, too, are available in the-
ory but dead in practice. The FEC might be able to restore 
some semblance of the old order by more effectively defining 
and enforcing the rules distinguishing between independent 
and coordinated activity.313 For starters, that would require the 
Commission to reconsider its decision to allow candidates and 
officeholders to raise funds for Super PACs, and its failure to 
bar Super PACs and candidates from sharing ad content and 
coordinating messages. Alternatively, new rules challenging 
the “independence” of committees run by former staffers of 
candidates aided by those committees could be considered. Cer-
tainly, the Commission could conclude that a candidate is coor-
dinating with a Super PAC when he or a member of his cam-
paign staff raises funds for or meets with staff to the Super 
PAC. But given the current make-up of the Commission, there 
is no prospect for any such action any time soon.314 More seri-
ously, either the FEC or Congress could begin compiling infor-
mation which could demonstrate that large contributions solic-
ited by candidates and party leaders, given to committees run 
by former campaign or party staff, and dedicated to promoting 
the elections of specific candidates or groups of candidates raise 
the same danger—money-purchased preferential access to 
elected officials—as the contributions to political parties re-
stricted by BCRA and sustained in McConnell. Indeed, contri-
butions to Super PACs raise exactly the same concerns about 
the undue influence of large donors on governance that the Su-
preme Court in Buckley determined justified FECA’s re-
strictions on contributions to candidates and committees that 
give to candidates. 
Like the contributors to candidates before FECA and the 
major soft-money donors before BCRA, the contributors to Su-
per PACs often have significant interests that will be affected 
by the decisions of the officials whose elections they are trying 
to influence.315 Many Super PAC donors are actively engaged in 
lobbying over a wide range of tax, regulatory, and other legisla-
tive issues.316 Individuals, firms, trade associations, and unions 
interested in such questions as the tax treatment of hedge fund 
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income,317 the eligibility of students attending for-profit colleg-
es for federal financial assistance,318 defense contracts,319 and 
the regulation of payday lending have all been major donors to 
Super PACs.320 Other leading Super PAC donors have compa-
rably intense interests in ideological or foreign policy issues.321 
The prospect of obtaining the benefit of extremely largeand 
legally unlimiteddonations to an allied Super PAC and of 
avoiding the costs of having an unlimited amount of hostile Su-
per PAC spending against you is at least as likely to affect the 
legislative, regulatory, and appointments decisions of elected 
officials as the relatively paltry amounts that candidates’ per-
sonal campaign committees are allowed to receive. And surely 
the demoralizing effects on voters “stemming from public 
awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime 
of large individual financial contributions” that so concerned 
the Supreme Court in Buckley,322 and has since become known 
as the “appearance of corruption” justification for the regula-
tion of contributions, is just as likely to result from the multi-
hundred-thousand and multi-million dollar donations to Super 
PACs as from contributions to candidates and political parties.  
At present there is little prospect of the FEC or Congress 
assessing the improper influence and appearance of corruption 
effects of unlimited donations to Super PACs and taking action 
either to limit Super PAC contributions or even to force a 
greater separation of Super PACs from the candidates they are 
backing. Even if such a law were to be enacted, it is doubtful 
whether it would pass constitutional muster with the current 
Supreme Court, unless a majority of the justices now agrees 
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with Justices Ginsburg and Breyer that “Montana’s experience, 
and experience elsewhere since this Court’s decision in Citizens 
United . . . make it exceedingly difficult to maintain that inde-
pendent expenditures by corporations ‘do not give rise to corrup-
tion or the appearance of corruption.’”323 Otherwise, a majority of 
the Court would have to be persuaded that at least in some cir-
cumstances donations to independent committees can be lim-
ited even if spending by such committees cannot be. 
  CONCLUSION   
More than a century after Congress enacted the first re-
strictions on contributions in federal elections, thirty-eight 
years after the comprehensive post-Watergate contribution lim-
its were adopted, and thirty-six years after they were sustained 
by the Supreme Court we appear to be rapidly heading into an 
era in which those contribution limits have been rendered func-
tionally meaningless. We shall soon find out what this means 
for our campaign finance system, our elections, and our politics. 
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